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Introduction
Antitrust is an important area of law and policy for most companies in
the world. Having divergent rules across antitrust systems means that identi-
cal economic behavior may be treated differently depending on the jurisdic-
tion. This leads to disparate outcomes, with one jurisdiction finding illegal
behavior (that the other does not) when the underlying behavior may be
pro-competitive. For example, one of the U.S. antitrust agencies, the U.S.
Federal Trade Commission (the other is the Department of Justice Antitrust
Division, or “DOJ Antitrust”) unanimously voted to close its investigation
into Google in 2013 after concluding that the company’s behavior was not
anticompetitive.1 Yet, in spite of this outcome, more recently the European
Commission’s Competition Commissioner and its antitrust agency
equivalent, the Directorate-General for Competition (“DG Competition”),
issued a statement of objections against Google in a case that remains ongo-
ing.2 This is but one example of how an antitrust divide continues to exist
across the Atlantic.
* University of Florida Research Professor, University of Florida Levin College of Law,
and Senior Of Counsel, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati.
1. Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Regarding Google’s Search Practices at
3–4, Google Inc., FTC File No. 111-0163 (F.T.C. Jan. 3, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/system/
files/documents/public_statements/295971/130103googlesearchstmtofcomm.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/H4TF-DVBX]. The FTC warned, “[c]hallenging Google’s product design decisions in
this case would require the Commission—or a court—to second-guess a firm’s product design
decisions where plausible procompetitive justifications have been offered, and where those
justifications are supported by ample evidence.” Id; see also Michael A. Salinger & Robert J.
Levinson, Economics and the FTC’s Google Investigation, 46 Rev. Indus. Org. 25 (2015) (pro-
viding an analysis of the issues and arguments in the FTC’s investigation).
2. European Commission Press Release IP/15/4780, Antitrust: Commission Sends State-
ment of Objections to Google on Comparison Shopping Service; Opens Separate Formal In-
vestigation on Android (Apr. 15, 2015) (articulating the Commission’s first Statement of
Objections).
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This disparate set of outcomes creates a world in which the most strin-
gent antitrust system may produce the global standard.3 As a result, if the
antitrust rules applied are too rigid, they threaten to hurt consumers not
merely in the jurisdiction where they are applied but globally as well.4 The
stakes are high, not merely in the tech sector, but more generally. Other
jurisdictions look to both the United States and Europe for guidance for
antitrust jurisprudence.5
Though antitrust law and economics has transformed across both the
United States and Europe in the past forty years, institutional differences
may explain, in part, these divergent outcomes. Starting in the 1970s, the
United States went through an antitrust revolution as it moved from multi-
ple public interest goals to a singular goal based on economic analysis.6 The
end result of that revolution is that antitrust in the United States has some
variation of economic efficiency as its sole goal (based on a welfare standard
of either total welfare or consumer welfare).7 The United States was the first
jurisdiction to give economic analysis primacy in antitrust law, although
other jurisdictions have since moved in this direction.8
Given that economic thinking continues to develop, case law plays a
particularly important role in antitrust. The Supreme Court recently ex-
plained in Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC:
3. See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, Welfare Standards in U.S. and E.U. Anti-
trust Enforcement, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 2497, 2531–32 (2013).
4. See id. at 2516; Daniel J. Gifford & Robert T. Kudrle, Rhetoric and Reality in the
Merger Standards of the United States, Canada, and the European Union, 72 Antitrust L.J. 423,
462–63 (2005).
5. See Blair & Sokol, supra note 3, at 2503.
6. See Vivek Ghosal, Regime Shift in Antitrust Laws, Economics, and Enforcement, 7 J.
Competition L. & Econ. 733, 773–74 (2011) (finding evidence of structural shifts in enforce-
ment in the 1970s); D. Daniel Sokol, Tensions Between Antitrust and Industrial Policy, 22 Geo.
Mason L. Rev. 1247, 1251–52 (2015) (“Much of US antitrust enforcement from the 1950s and
1960s is an embarrassment by today’s standards. . . . This approach in US case law began to
change in the late 1970s . . . . In the United States, antitrust liability has narrowed due to a
better understanding of economics, and antitrust analysis is now driven by economic
analysis.”).
7. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762 (1984); Reiter v.
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433
U.S. 36, 54–57 (1977). Of course, a debate within the academy—and to a lesser extent before
the Supreme Court—still exists as to whether “total welfare,” “consumer welfare,” or a com-
pletely different standard is the proper formulation of economic efficiency. Compare Joseph
Farrell & Michael L. Katz, The Economics of Welfare Standards in Antitrust, Competition Pol’y
Int’l, Autumn 2006, at 3 (concluding that the consumer surplus standard has some
strengths), and John B. Kirkwood, The Essence of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers and Small
Suppliers from Anticompetitive Conduct, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 2425 (2013) (arguing for a con-
sumer welfare standard), with Alan J. Meese, Reframing the (False?) Choice Between Purchaser
Welfare and Total Welfare, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 2197 (2013) (arguing for a new “trade-off”
model), and Barak Orbach, How Antitrust Lost Its Goal, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 2253 (2013)
(arguing that competition should be the primary goal).
8. See Blair & Sokol, supra note 3, at 2508–09, 2513–15.
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We have therefore felt relatively free to revise our legal analysis as economic
understanding evolves and . . . to reverse antitrust precedents that mis-
perceived a practice’s competitive consequences. Moreover, because the
question in those cases was whether the challenged activity restrained
trade, the Court’s rulings necessarily turned on its understanding of
economics.9
In Europe, by contrast, the shift to greater economic analysis in antitrust
(or as they call it, competition law) started in earnest only in the early
2000s—though as this Review will illustrate, economic analysis has not per-
meated as far in European competition law cases as it has in the United
States, even if the language used by the European Commission’s Competi-
tion Commissioner and DG Competition is that of consumer welfare.10
In their book The Atlantic Divide in Antitrust: An Examination of US and
EU Competition Policy, Daniel Gifford and Robert Kudrle11 analyze a distinct
set of cases across a number of different substantive areas in the two juris-
dictions. In doing so, they also discuss the potential for both convergence
and divergence (Chapter Ten). Their comparative analysis makes an impor-
tant and well-informed contribution to the literature, even if parts of the
book might have limitations.
Gifford and Kudrle begin their book by examining the different histori-
cal and institutional perspectives in U.S. and European antitrust (Chapter
One), providing important context for the development of the analysis of
the cases that follow in subsequent chapters. They then articulate the various
economic standards for antitrust harm across both systems in the context of
judicial review (Chapter Two). Next, they examine merger policy and how
the two systems treat merger efficiencies (Chapter Three). The subsequent
chapters discuss particular types of conduct—price discrimination (Chapter
Four), predatory pricing (Chapter Five), exclusive supply contracts (Chapter
Six), both single product (Chapter Seven) and bundled discounts (Chapter
Eight), and the comparative Microsoft antitrust cases (Chapter Nine)—as a
way of framing a broader discussion of antitrust in high technology and in
the area of antitrust–IP interface issues.
This Review first explores the developments of the goals of antitrust
(and how these goals shape enforcement) and the particular insights and
shortcomings of Gifford and Kudrle’s investigation into comparative anti-
trust—in particular, the area of greatest cross-Atlantic discord: cases involv-
ing single firm conduct, especially in markets characterized by high
technology and innovation. Second, this Review explores cartel law and pol-
icy, a topic that Gifford and Kudrle overlook entirely. This is a surprising
9. 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2412–13 (2015) (citation omitted).
10. Blair & Sokol, supra note 3, at 2513–15, 2530. For a catalog of EU cases, see generally
Ariel Ezrachi, EU Competition Law: An Analytical Guide to the Leading Cases (4th
ed. 2014).
11. Daniel J. Gifford is the Robins Kaplan Professor of Law at the University of Minne-
sota Law School. Robert T. Kudrle is the Orville and Jane Freeman Chair in International
Trade and Investment Policy at the University of Minnesota Humphrey School of Public Af-
fairs, as well as an adjunct faculty member with the University of Minnesota Law School.
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omission given that cartel activity is the highest enforcement priority in the
area of nonmerger conduct in both the United States and Europe (at the EC
level) in terms of the number of cases.12 Moreover, it is an area in which the
law and policy is in flux on both sides of the Atlantic.13
I. Divergent Goals
In the comparative context, Gifford and Kudrle effectively point out
that, while upon first glance, judicial review looks the same across the two
jurisdictions (p. 37), in practice cases come out differently. This is because
of  different sets of considerations, goals, and institutional design issues in
the two systems, including noneconomic goals, which are more significantly
embedded in the European case law,14 and significant deference by European
courts to DG Competition in the conduct context.15
Path dependency based on multiple overarching goals remains a funda-
mental characteristic of European antitrust case law.16 Europe also has more
of an interventionist flavor than the United States,17 which, as Gifford and
Kudrle discuss, is a result of having those multiple goals embedded in the
competition law on the books.18 These goals include fairness, European inte-
gration, and the protection of rivals (pp. 12–13). Even if DG Competition
states that its sole goal is consumer welfare,19 Europe remains a far more
favorable jurisdiction for a finding of a competition law infringement than
the United States, where the shift to a singular goal of antitrust and the
primacy of economic analysis has led to more rule of reason analysis and less
12. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Division Workload Statistics FY
2006–2015, at 1 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/788426/download [https://perma.cc/
PT5U-HBML]; Alexander Italianer, European Union: Directorate General for Competition, Eu-
ropean Antitrust Review 2016, http://globalcompetitionreview.com/reviews/72/sections/
239/chapters/2891/european-union-directorate-general-competition (on file with the Michi-
gan Law Review).
13. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Competition Policy and Price Fixing 69–100 (2013);
William E. Kovacic et al., Plus Factors and Agreement in Antitrust Law, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 393,
405–09 (2011); William H. Page, Objective and Subjective Theories of Concerted Action, 79 An-
titrust L.J. 215, 216–22 (2013).
14. See pp. 8–14.
15. See, e.g., pp. 34–38.
16. Ben Van Rompuy, Economic Efficiency: The Sole Concern of Modern Anti-
trust Policy? § 3.02, at 124–28 (2012); see also Liza Lovdahl Gormsen, The Conflict Between
Economic Freedom and Consumer Welfare in the Modernisation of Article 82 EC, 3 Eur. Compe-
tition J. 329, 332–42 (2007).
17. See generally Francesco Russo et al., European Commission Decisions on Com-
petition 113–97 (2010) (analyzing and classifying all European Commission decisions from
1962 through 2009).
18. See pp. 8–17. For recent formulations in the courts on these goals, see, for example,
Case C-8/08, T-Mobile Netherlands BV v. Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededinging-
sautoriteit, 2009 E.C.R. I-4529, and Joined Cases C-468/06 to C-478/06, Sot. Le´elos kai Sia EE
v. GlaxoSmithKline AEVE Farmakeftikon Proionton, 2008 E.C.R. I-7139.
19. Blair & Sokol, supra note 3, at 2513.
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intervention.20 In Europe, however, having multiple goals, even in modern
case law, tends to push antitrust law into more aggressive enforcement of
behavior than may be efficient. As such, case analysis by the European courts
sometimes leads to outcomes that are not efficiency based (p. 34). In the
language of European competition law: too much European case law is sub-
ject to too many practices that are categorized by “object”21 (where eco-
nomic analysis is not required) rather than “effect”22 (which requires
economic analysis).23 The move to economic analysis has been proceeding
since the 1990s. But, perhaps surprisingly, the first time the term “consumer
welfare” was mentioned meaningfully in a decided case by the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) was 2012 in Post Danmark A/S v. Konkurrencera˚det.24
When there are multiple goals used in the underlying analyses of cases, it
makes planning of pro-competitive business behavior more difficult because
a firm that legitimately competes on the merits may be punished for its
success.
The strong-interventionist case law and enforcement in Europe also op-
erates in the shadow of the law, serving as leverage to extract greater conces-
sions in commitment decisions from firms that are under investigation.
These firms end up settling because they do not think that a win before the
highly deferential courts is likely.25
One area where European courts have pushed back against overly re-
strictive competitive effects analysis is mergers (pp. 35–36). This pushback is
20. See generally William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy
Enforcement Norms, 71 Antitrust L.J. 377 (2003) (describing the U.S. enforcement agencies’
hesitance to bring antitrust claims).
21. T-Mobile Netherlands BV, 2009 E.C.R. I-4529 ¶ 43 (providing a rationale for “object”
analysis).
22. Pinar Akman, The Tests of Illegality Under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, 61 Antitrust
Bull. 84, 86 (2016).
23. Pinar Akman, The Reform of the Application of Article 102 TFEU: Mission Accom-
plished?, 81 Antitrust L.J. 145, 151–52, 203–04 (2016).
24. Case C-209/10, Post Danmark A/S v. Konkurrencera˚det, 2012 E.C.R., ¶ 42 (delivered
March 27, 2012), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=121061&
pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=565095 [https://perma
.cc/D5AL-XHQ5]. The use of the term “consumer welfare” had become institutionalized
within DG Competition earlier with the establishment of an economics group and a Chief
Economist. The embrace of economic analysis (at least on paper) within DG Competition
occurred in both the Merger Guidelines, European Comm’n, EU Competition Law: Rules
Applicable to Merger Control 184 (2010) (quoting Guidelines on the Assessment of Hori-
zontal Mergers Under the Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations Between Under-
takings, 2004 O.J. (C 31) 5, ¶ 61), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/
merger_compilation.pdf [https://perma.cc/3U4D-PFKV], and the Article 82 Guidance, Com-
munication from the Commission—Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Ap-
plying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings,
2009 O.J. (C 45) 7, ¶ 19 [hereinafter Guidance Paper].
25. Niamh Dunne, Commitment Decisions in EU Competition Law, 10 J. Competition L.
& Econ. 399, 405, 425 (2014); Florian Wagner-von Papp, Best and Even Better Practices in
Commitment Procedures After Alrosa: The Dangers of Abandoning the “Struggle for Competition
Law”, 49 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 929, 966–67 (2012).
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significant because in merger law the courts have reversed the European
Commission, where there had been errors in accuracy of information assess-
ment and in economic analysis (pp. 36–37). Significant judicial oversight of
DG Competition means that the agency is less likely to bring merger cases
where its analysis and the underlying economics are weaker. Contrast this
with dominance cases, where the courts had the ability to create similar lim-
iting principles for DG Competition in the Microsoft case but where the
General Court remained deferential to the Commission.26 Perhaps for this
reason, scholars, including Gifford and Kudrle, have been far more critical of
DG Competition’s conduct cases rather than its merger cases.27
II. Single Firm Conduct
Single-firm conduct addresses that part of antitrust where a monopolist
exercises its power to raise prices and/or exclude its competitors.28 Enforce-
ment agencies must determine how to best limit the unlawful exercise of
monopoly power while avoiding overenforcement, using resources effi-
ciently, and incentivizing innovation. It is perhaps the most complex part of
antitrust analysis. Gifford and Kudrle spend a number of chapters address-
ing various forms of conduct in their book and areas of ambiguity or diffi-
culty in case law. This Part addresses some of the ambiguities of how single
firm conduct issues play out comparatively.
Since its inception, antitrust has fixated on the behavior of dominant
firms.29 Such cases involve exclusion30 or predation.31 In both scenarios, the
Sherman Act “directs itself not against conduct which is competitive, even
severely so, but against conduct which unfairly tends to destroy competition
itself.”32 Due to the procedural and substantive tightening on antitrust doc-
trine that has occurred since the U.S. antitrust revolution in the 1970s, there
are fewer exclusion cases now than in the prior era.33 For the most part, U.S.
case law has been scrubbed of its earlier excesses. In Europe, however, such
26. Pp. 37–38 (“[T]he deference accorded by the General Court to the Commission’s
Microsoft decision seems without parallel in the US case law on judicial review because of the
magnitude of the policy issues involved.”).
27. See, e.g., pp. 37–38.
28. See Dennis W. Carlton & Jeffrey M. Perloff, Modern Industrial Organiza-
tion 94–99 (4th ed. 2005).
29. See, e.g., p. 4; Barak Orbach & Grace Campbell Rebling, The Antitrust Curse of Big-
ness, 85 S. Cal. L. Rev. 605 (2012).
30. A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusionary Conduct Under the Antitrust Laws: Balancing, Sac-
rifice, and Refusals to Deal, 20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1247, 1248 (2005) (“[C]onduct by a firm
or group of firms that weakens rivals or excludes them from the market and can thereby
enable the firm or firms engaging in the conduct to gain market power.” (footnote omitted)).
31. See generally 3A Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An
Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application ¶¶ 722–49 (4th ed. 2015).
32. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993).
33. Pp. 85–86; John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White, Introduction, in The Antitrust
Revolution: Economics, Competition, and Policy 2–6 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J.
White eds., 6th ed. 2014); see also Einer Elhauge, Harvard, Not Chicago: Which Antitrust School
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anachronistic cases remain on the books, and recent cases repeat
noneconomic formulations of the goals of competition law, which lead to
results that may chill pro-competitive business behavior (pp. 92–94,
98–100). Further, in conduct cases under Articles 101 and 102 TEFU (the
rough equivalent of the United States’ Sherman Act sections 1 and 2), the
European courts have not created limiting principles with regard to eco-
nomic analysis as the same courts have in the merger context.34 Although
Article 102 was “modernized” with a Guidance Paper to help push Europe to
more of an effects-based approach centered on economic analysis,35 attempts
to modernize case law and practice remain a work in progress. Sometimes
economic analysis guides decisions, but in other cases the Commission takes
a more formalistic approach.36 Worse, as this Review discusses herein in the
chapters on conduct (pp. 63–196), unlike in the area of mergers, the Euro-
pean courts have not limited DG Competition’s rulings because of faulty, or
even a lack of, economic analysis.37 The lack of limiting principles means a
more aggressive Commission with regard to dominance cases (even when
the behavior may not have anticompetitive effect), which leads to greater
uncertainty for business decisions that require complex antitrust analysis
and to findings of infringement of European competition law when the be-
havior in question is not anticompetitive. It also creates incentives to bring
cases even if the cases settle because any such settlement is a “win” for pur-
poses of bureaucratic politics.38
One such example of the difficulty of modernizing practice is Intel,39 a
case to which Gifford and Kudrle devote a portion of Chapter Seven. In
Intel, one of the earliest post-Guidance Paper cases, the Commission found
that Intel had infringed Article 102 TEFU—even without providing an-
ticompetitive effects.40 More specifically, the Commission argued that there
Drives Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decisions?, Competition Pol’y Int’l, Autumn 2007, at 59,
68–70 (discussing one predatory buying case that had “no Supreme Court precedent”).
34. See p. 98. Angela Zhang suggests that the motivation to overturn a Commission
decision in the area of conduct may not be benign. She notes, “As members and staff of the
Court of Justice do not want their dockets flooded with appeals from the General Court, they
are likely to be less inclined to annul the Commission’s decisions.” Angela Huyue Zhang, The
Faceless Court, 38 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 71, 118–24 (2016).
35. Guidance Paper, supra note 24, para. 19.
36. See Akman, supra note 23, at 149–50; see also Pinar Akman, The European Commis-
sion’s Guidance on Article 102TFEU: From Inferno to Paradiso?, 73 Mod. L. Rev. 605, 624
(2010) (suggesting the Commission has taken a more formalistic approach at times, rather
than a consumer welfare standard).
37. See supra note 34 and accompanying text; see also Akman, supra note 22.
38. See David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Can’t Anyone Here Play This Game?
Judging the FTC’s Critics, 83 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1948, 1973–74 (2015).
39. Commission Decision Summary No. 2009/C 227/07 (Intel), 2009 O.J. (C 227) 13.
40. Id. at 17.
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was no requirement to show actual foreclosure because a 102 TFEU viola-
tion could be found merely from “object” practices by a dominant firm.41
On appeal, the General Court upheld the European Commission’s deci-
sion,42 stating that there was no need to show competitive effects that harm
consumers once an anticompetitive object has been found.43 Though there
was some economic analysis in the case, there was no discussion of a
counterfactual to Intel’s behavior, precisely the opposite of the Guidance Pa-
per’s test for such behavior.44 Intel has not been an isolated case of discussing
conduct by its object when the discussion should be by the conduct’s effect.
Similar analysis can be found in contemporary cases such as Michelin II45
and AstraZeneca46 (both in the decisions of the General Court and European
Court of Justice). Overall, across chapters in the book, Gifford and Kudrle
show the divide between the economics-based effects approach set forth in
the Guidance Paper and case law.47 This lack of coherence chills pro-compet-
itive behavior. Advocate General Wahl’s recent Intel opinion (post publica-
tion of the book), offers hope that the European case law is moving in the
right direction towards greater economic analysis.48
Nevertheless, while the European academic opinion is clearly trending
in favor of more economic analysis in doctrine,49 some European case law, in
dicta, even goes so far as to suggest hostility to the economics-based effects
approach. In the Post Danmark II case, Advocate General Kokott wrote:
It is my view that, in its replies, the signal effect of which is likely to extend
well beyond the present case, . . . the Court should not allow itself to be
influenced so much by current thinking (‘Zeitgeist’) or ephemeral trends,
41. Commission Decision No. 2009/C 227/07 (Intel), slip op. ¶¶ 919, 923 (May 13,
2009), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/ICT/intel_provisional_decision.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/X93S-9XYW].
42. Case T-286/09, Intel Corp. v. Comm’n, 2014 E.C.R., ¶¶ 198–206 (delivered June 12,
2014), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62009TJ0286&from=
EN [https://perma.cc/6CJK-BHVT].
43. See id. ¶ 145.
44. Akman, supra note 23, at 186–87.
45. See Case T-203/01, Manufacture franc¸aise des pneumatiques Michelin v. Comm’n
(Michelin II), 2003 E.C.R. II-4071, ¶¶ 241–42.
46. See Case C-457/10 P, AstraZeneca AB v. Comm’n, 2012 E.C.R., ¶ 165 (delivered Dec.
6, 2012), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62010CJ0457&lang1=en&type=TXT
&ancre= [https://perma.cc/8K8Y-2AC4]; Case T-321/05, AstraZeneca AB v. Comm’n, 2010
E.C.R. II-2805, ¶ 902.
47. See, e.g., pp. 134–35.
48. See Case C-413/14 P, Intel Corp. v. Comm’n (Oct. 20, 2016), http://eur-lex.europa
.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62014CC0413 [https://perma.cc/B5UD-PZUZ].
49. See Pablo Iba´n˜ez Colomo, Beyond the “More Economics-Based Approach”: A Legal
Perspective on Article 102 TFEU Case Law, 53 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 709, 710–11 (2016);
Nicolas Petit, Intel, Leveraging Rebates and the Goals of Article 102 TFEU, 11 Eur. Competi-
tion J. 26, 67 (2015) (“[T]he case-law analysis provided by the Intel court in support of its
reasoning is on the whole very weak and riddled with disconcerting inconsistencies.”).
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but should have regard rather to the legal foundations on which the prohi-
bition of abuse of a dominant position rests in EU law.50
She later added further skepticism, noting, “the added value of expen-
sive economic analyses is not always apparent.”51 Across the different chap-
ters that otherwise do a good job in analyzing particular areas of antitrust
law, Gifford and Kudrle do not capture as precisely as they should how criti-
cal this struggle within European competition policy is in terms of the goals
of competition policy leading to doctrinal changes. While Gifford and Kud-
rle provide excellent analysis of the cases they cover, by not emphasizing
how the battle for goals remains an issue in conduct cases, they underplay
the impediments to more economically reasonable cases in Europe and, ulti-
mately, to prosecutorial discretion for such cases. Without European courts
more critical of non-effects-based analysis, there is the potential for pro-
competitive behavior to be chilled.
In a case like Intel in the United States, by contrast, a plaintiff would
have to demonstrate anticompetitive harm through an analysis of competi-
tive effects.52 To my knowledge, the emphasis on economic analysis is em-
bedded in the judiciary. In their opinions, judges in the United States do not
tend to question the analytical basis of economic analysis in antitrust juris-
prudence. This is because of the uniformity of Supreme Court cases since
the mid-1970s in shaping how lower courts use economic analysis in anti-
trust cases.53
One area of increasing divergence across the Atlantic is in markets char-
acterized by high technology and dynamic innovation. Conduct issues rang-
ing from online search,54 online resale price maintenance, and online most-
50. Case C-23/14, Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrencera˚det (Post Danmark II) ¶ 4 (May
21, 2015), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=164331&pageIn
dex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=534256 [https://perma.cc/J29U-
XMDZ].
51. Id. ¶ 66.
52. For some of the approaches to discounts, see, for example, Daniel A. Crane, Bargain-
ing Over Loyalty, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 253 (2013); Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the
Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 397 (2009); and Herbert
Hovenkamp, Discounts and Exclusion, 2006 Utah L. Rev. 841.
53. See, e.g., Douglas H. Ginsburg, Originalism and Economic Analysis: Two Case Studies
of Consistency and Coherence in Supreme Court Decision Making, 33 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y
217, 218 (2010) (“Starting in the 1970s, the Supreme Court began systematically reworking
antitrust doctrine in order to bring it into alignment with the modern economic understand-
ing of competition.”).
54. See Aaron S. Edlin & Robert G. Harris, The Role of Switching Costs in Antitrust Analy-
sis: A Comparison of Microsoft and Google, 15 Yale J.L. & Tech. 169 (2013); Florian Wagner-
Von Papp, Should Google’s Secret Sauce Be Organic?, 16 Melbourne J. Int’l L. 609 (2015).
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favored-nation clauses;55 pharmaceutical reverse payments;56 and FRAND li-
censing,57 among other issues, are hotly contested. Europe seems to be the
more aggressive enforcer in areas where the stakes are high, the issues com-
plex, the likelihood of mistaken enforcement may be high, and the industrial
policy broadly defined may be influencing European competition policy.58
One complaint of industrial policy in European antitrust came from no
less than the then President of the United States. President Obama suggested
that some European antitrust enforcement targeting U.S. tech companies
might be essentially an element of European industrial policy. President
Obama explained in an interview with Kara Swisher: “We have owned the
Internet. Our companies have created it, expanded it, perfected it, in ways
[that inefficient European competitors] can’t compete [with]. And often-
times what is portrayed as high-minded positions on issues sometimes is
designed to carve out their commercial interests.”59
President Obama’s comment is relevant to a larger issue involving single
firm conduct: case law involving high technology cuts across antitrust. Given
how few decided cases there are before the courts involving high technology,
much of the “action” occurs in the shadow of the law. Gifford and Kudrle
emphasize the easiest comparison of high-tech issues—the Microsoft saga
that remains important to the present. Gifford and Kudrle discuss how anti-
trust addresses technology and innovation in the U.S. and European
Microsoft cases (Chapter Nine). These cases were seminal in understanding
how antitrust addressed new economy issues in both jurisdictions. Since that
time, technology has played an increased role in terms of both merger cases
and conduct cases (pp. 191–94). Unfortunately, however, Gifford and Kud-
rle do not discuss these more recent cases in detail, nor do they discuss tech
markets, antitrust, and the difference between merger and dominance cases
55. See Pinar Akman & D. Daniel Sokol, Online RPM and MFN Under Antitrust Law and
Economics, 50 Rev. Indust. Org. 133 (2017); Ariel Ezrachi, The Competitive Effects of Parity
Clauses on Online Commerce, 11 Eur. Competition J. 488 (2015); John B. Kirkwood, Collu-
sion to Control a Powerful Customer: Amazon, E-Books, and Antitrust Policy, 69 U. Miami L.
Rev. 1 (2014).
56. See Michael A. Carrier, Why a “Large and Unjustified” Payment Threshold Is Not Con-
sistent with Actavis, 91 Wash. L. Rev. 109 (2016); Michael Clancy et al., Reverse-Payment
Patent Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry: An Analysis of U.S. Antitrust Law and EU
Competition Law, 59 Antitrust Bull. 153 (2014).
57. See Damien Geradin, The Meaning of “Fair and Reasonable” in the Context of Third-
Party Determination of FRAND Terms, 21 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 919 (2014); Daryl Lim, Stan-
dard Essential Patents, Trolls, and the Smartphone Wars: Triangulating the End Game, 119 Pa.
St. L. Rev. 1 (2014).
58. Sokol, supra note 6, at 1254–58.
59. Kurt Wagner, Kara Swisher Interviews President Barack Obama on Cyber Security,
Privacy and His Relationship with Silicon Valley (Video), Recode (Feb. 13, 2015, 4:39 PM),
http://www.recode.net/2015/2/13/11559018/barack-obama-recode-kara-swisher-video [https:/
/perma.cc/8CVC-27FQ]. On the misuse of antitrust by competitors, see William J. Baumol &
Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition, 28 J.L. & Econ. 247, 250 (1985),
and D. Daniel Sokol, The Strategic Use of Public and Private Litigation in Antitrust as Business
Strategy, 85 S. Cal. L. Rev. 689, 693 (2012).
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(at least in Europe where the differences in case law between the two are
significant) outside of the Microsoft cases.
Though there is no need for new antitrust rules specifically for markets
characterized by innovation,60 particular care must be given in such markets
where some of the assumptions of how competition works may differ from
those of more traditional markets.61 In such technology-driven markets
there is rapid technological transformation and innovation across a number
of different paths, including products, services, and platforms.
Because of the rapid transformation of tech-based markets, the tradi-
tional structural presumption of market power may be transient.62 Markets
move quickly across different platforms from general search to more special-
ized search, and from social networks to apps. The concept of fast-changing
markets in antitrust emerges from Joseph Schumpeter’s views on creative
destruction.63 The method of competition in these markets is such that
traditional markets can be subject to significant disruption.64 In a number of
circumstances, firms compete for the market rather than in the market.65 As
a result, prediction for mergers is more difficult, as is understanding the
competitive effects in conduct cases, because the innovation in question may
not be linked to a preexisting market. This is not to argue that antitrust has
no role to play in fast-moving markets. Rather, as with other areas of anti-
trust, the problem with antitrust intervention is that without a clear theory
60. It is worth keeping in mind, however, the recent populist attempts at reasserting “big
is bad” in the tech world. See Andrea Renda, Searching for Harm or Harming Search? A
Look at the European Commission’s Antitrust Investigation Against Google (2015),
https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/AR%20Antitrust%20Investigation%20Google.pdf [https://
perma.cc/M3XE-MEEG] (acknowledging this tendency in Europe); Senator Elizabeth Warren,
Keynote Remarks at New America’s Open Markets Program Event: Reigniting Competition in
the American Economy (June 29, 2016), http://www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/2016-
6-29_Warren_Antitrust_Speech.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8VP-L8W6] (exemplifying a similar
populist tendency in the United States). Such populism is not new (although its impulses
remain underdeveloped in Gifford and Kudrle) to antitrust. See Barak Orbach & D. Daniel
Sokol, Antitrust Energy, 85 S. Cal. L. Rev. 429, 439 (2012) (“The evolution of antitrust has
been shaped by changing lines of economic thinking and ideologies.”). But such thinking lacks
economic sophistication and understanding of how markets work. See Liran Einav & Jonathan
Levin, Empirical Industrial Organization: A Progress Report, J. Econ. Persp., Spring 2010, at
145, 152–56.
61. See chapter 9.
62. Renata B. Hesse, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. for Criminal & Civil Operations, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Remarks as Prepared for the Conference on Competition and IP Policy in
High-Technology Industries: At the Intersection of Antitrust & High-Tech: Opportunities for
Constructive Engagement 5 (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/303152
.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7AL-7HXV].
63. See Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy 82–83 (3d ed.
1950); Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation, 74
Antitrust L.J. 575, 578 (2007).
64. See generally Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma: The Revolu-
tionary Book That Will Change the Way You Do Business (1997).
65. See J. Gregory Sidak & David J. Teece, Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law, 5 J.
Competition L. & Econ. 581, 615 (2009).
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of harm linked to facts that match up with economic theory, aggressive anti-
trust enforcement creates the negative potential of chilling pro-competitive
innovation.
Gifford and Kudrle’s chapter on Microsoft could have served as a spring-
board to discuss two-sided market analysis in tech markets. According to the
economics literature, double-sided markets occur when firms or platforms
have the ability to bring together distinct types of economic actors (e.g.,
online auctions such as eBay, dating services such as Tinder, search engines
such as Google, or social network sites such as Facebook).66 In such markets,
services on one side of the market often may be free for users, and firms may
make money from advertising.
This market structure complicates traditional antitrust analysis. A first
step in antitrust analysis is market definition. In one-sided markets, an in-
crease in price or decrease in output provides guidance on how to undertake
the subsequent analysis.67 In two-sided markets in which one side is free,
however, a traditional market share calculation is inadequate because one
side of the market may serve to subsidize the other.68
This limitation to market definition in high-tech cases involving two-
sided markets is just part of what is increasingly a convergence across the
Atlantic of the limits of the use of market definition, particularly in merger
analysis. This discussion of how high technology works in the merger con-
text, particularly in Europe where there is case law (in contrast to the con-
duct area), suggests that European antitrust is capable of understanding tech
issues and gives hope that DG Competition and the courts can do better
going forward in tech-related antitrust conduct cases.
In the area of U.S. mergers, there has been a move away from market
share in the 2010 Merger Guidelines.69 Though the European merger guide-
lines have not been revised so recently, European merger cases suggest that a
high market share is not fatal with regard to market power. This includes
66. See Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 1
J. Eur. Econ. Ass’n. 990, 990 (2003). For an overview of the multisided market literature, see
David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, The Antitrust Analysis of Multisided Platform Busi-
nesses, in 1 The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics 404 (Roger
D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2015).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 238 (2d Cir. 2003).
68. United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 185–86 (2d Cir. 2016); Elena
Argentesi & Lapo Filistrucchi, Estimating Market Power in a Two-Sided Market: The Case of
Newspapers, 22 J. Applied Econometrics 1247, 1247–48 (2007).
69. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guide-
lines (2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2010/08/19/hmg-2010.pdf
[https://perma.cc/997Z-SGBM]. This can also be seen in Professor Kaplow’s compelling writ-
ing. See Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 437 (2010).
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cases such as Microsoft/Skype,70 Alcatel/Telettra,71 Canon/Iris,72 and ARM/Gie-
secke & Devrient/Gemalto.73 Similarly, in the United States, the majority of
merger closing statement cases at both DOJ Antitrust and the FTC do not
turn on issues of market concentration but on competitive effects.74 In con-
trast, the structural presumption plays a larger role in litigated merger cases
in the United States due to a lack of modern analysis by the Supreme Court,
which last reviewed antitrust merger jurisprudence in the 1970s and for
which the structural presumption weighs heavily in the case law of the
1960s.75
Contrast the lack of focus on effects in some abuse of dominance cases
to how the courts have discussed effects in merger cases involving technol-
ogy in Europe. In a series of cases, both DG Competition and the European
courts have recognized that the dynamics of online markets may, at times,
be different than those of traditional markets. For example, in Microsoft’s
merger with Skype, the General Court noted that network effects (the effects
of a good or service to others who may use that good or service) do not
necessarily create barriers to entry.76 Rather, the court recognized that “the
existence of network effects does not necessarily procure a competitive ad-
vantage for the new entity.”77 The reason for this is that direct network ef-
fects may not necessarily apply in certain high-tech markets. To distinguish
further between two types of network effects, there are direct (more people
on the network allows for scale, such as with Skype) and indirect network
effects (complementary goods are produced, such as with an ATM network).
This distinction between direct versus indirect network effects is particularly
70. Case T-79/12, Cisco Sys. Inc. v. Comm’n, 2013 E.C.R., ¶¶ 9, 138 (delivered Dec. 11,
2013), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62012TJ0079&lang1=en&type=TXT&
ancre= [https://perma.cc/L4CW-GPX7] (dismissing the case despite finding a market share of
80 to 90 percent).
71. Commission Decision No. 91/251/EEC (Alcatel/Telettra), 1991 O.J. (L 122) 48, 53
(finding a combined market share of over 80 percent).
72. Commission Decision No. 2013/C 111/05 (Canon/Iris), slip op. tbl. 3 (Feb. 18, 2013),
cited in 2013 O.J. (C111) 3, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=14791637080
89&uri=CELEX:32013M6773 [https://perma.cc/Q3Z2-RVRC] (showing market share of up to
100 percent).
73. Commission Decision No. 2012/C 368/04 (ARM/Giesecke & Devrient/Gemalto/JV),
slip op. ¶ 65 (Nov. 6, 2012), cited in 2012 O.J. (C 368) 9, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
mergers/cases/decisions/m6564_20121106_20212_2779342_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/SJ37-
9ATG] (finding market share of 80 percent).
74. Michael G. Cowie & Paul T. Denis, The Fall of Structural Evidence in FTC and DOJ
Merger Review, Antitrust Source, Feb. 2013, at 1, 8.
75. See J. Robert Robertson, Editor’s Note: Philadelphia National Bank at 50, 80 Anti-
trust L.J. 189 (2015) (discussing the structural presumption in an introduction to a special
issue on the topic); see also, e.g., United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963);
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 343–44 (1962).
76. Case T-79/12, Cisco Sys. Inc. v. Comm’n, 2013 E.C.R., ¶ 76 (delivered Dec. 11, 2013),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62012TJ0079&lang1=en&type=TXT&ancre=
[https://perma.cc/L4CW-GPX7].
77. Id.
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important given the discussion that Gifford and Kudrle have in their
Microsoft chapter on the tying claim in that case, in which Microsoft’s tying
of the internet explorer to its operating system played such an important
role in the case of direct network effect to the theory of harm (pp. 170–71).
With regard to mergers, because of the speed of change in online markets,
the European Commission similarly found in the Facebook/WhatsApp
merger that because of fast-moving markets, “any leading market position
even if assisted by network effects is unlikely to be incontestable.”78
Not only are online markets fast moving and therefore potentially have
low barriers to entry, arguments have emerged in such contexts to provide a
duty to deal for less efficient competitors. Gifford and Kudrle correctly pro-
vide an analysis of the significant limitations on the duty to deal and also
provide context for these limitations in high-tech antitrust (pp. 162–66).
They note that the European case law more readily accepts refusals to supply
and refusals to deal than U.S. case law (although the duty is not broad).79
Something Gifford and Kudrle fail to mention, however, is that, importantly,
in addition to the limits on the European case law, the Guidance Paper also
shows deep reluctance to create blanket obligations for rivals.80
The context for refusals to deal is different in Europe where, unlike the
United States, there is a history of state-owned enterprises.81 In what is per-
haps still the leading economic policy book of European competition law,
the most recent former chief economist of DG Competition, in his prior
academic writing, also shows great reluctance to undertake an aggressive ap-
proach with regard to refusals to deal.82 But the impulse for broader use of
such an approach by the more populist elements within other parts of the
European Union structure suggest the potential for mischief in EU competi-
tion law on this topic.83
Thus far, insights that have found their way into European merger law
with regard to high technology and economic analysis have not yet found
their way into European abuse-of-dominance case law. Such a revisiting is in
order with European antitrust concern over the companies that have been
78. Commission Decision No. 2014/C 417/02 (Facebook/WhatsApp), slip op. ¶ 132 (Oct.
3, 2014), cited in 2014 O.J. (C 417) 4, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/deci-
sions/m7217_20141003_20310_3962132_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7FU-UPZV].
79. See p. 166.
80. Guidance Paper, supra note 24, para. 75.
81. See Commission Roundtable on the Application of Antitrust Law to State-Owned Enter-
prises (Oct. 20, 2009), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/multilateral/antitrustlaw
.pdf [https://perma.cc/BWG5-A6C4] (discussing the prevalence of state-owned enterprises and
the application of antitrust law to these enterprises).
82. Massimo Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice 89 (2004) (“Com-
petition laws and their enforcement should therefore ensure that firms will be able to enjoy the
rewards for their investments. I have therefore argued that any expropriation of firms’ assets
(whether material or immaterial) should be avoided. As a consequence, resorting to the essen-
tial facilities doctrine (granting assets of crucial assets to competitors), to price controls, or
even more drastic structural remedies must be carried out only in truly exceptional
circumstances.”).
83. See, e.g., Renda, supra note 60, at 39–40.
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termed “GAFA” (Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon).84 Perhaps part of
the aggressiveness of DG Competition and EU Member State prosecution at
the national level is due to the fact the European courts have not yet limited
the abuse of dominance law the way that they have limited the Commis-
sion’s merger jurisprudence to economic effects in a series of cases, includ-
ing Airtours/First Choice,85 Schneider/Legrand,86 and Tetra Laval/Sidel.87 As
Gifford and Kudrle correctly note, the European Microsoft decision was the
chance to extend this thinking to dominance cases, but the General Court
did not (pp. 36–37). As a result, as Gifford and Kudrle explain, “the defer-
ence accorded by the General Court to the Commission’s Microsoft decision
seems without parallel in the US case law on judicial review because of the
magnitude of the policy issues involved” (p. 38). Perhaps a similar pushback
by the General Court and the European Court of Justice is needed in domi-
nance to keep DG Competition “honest” in its jurisprudence and to focus
more on an effects-based economic analysis.
III. Cartel Policy
At a basic level, there is consensus that cartels (companies or individuals
who collude through an illegal contract, typically to raise prices) are a prob-
lem of major concern in antitrust. In the United States, active cartel enforce-
ment has long been a hallmark antitrust enforcement—even if the design of
that enforcement has been suboptimal due to problems of both insufficient
detection and punishment.88 Over time, through case law and policy, fines
have ratcheted up.89 Government emphasis on cartel prosecutions has been a
priority across presidential administrations. Further, the Supreme Court has
observed that cartels are “the supreme evil of antitrust.”90
Though both the United States and Europe are now active cartel enforc-
ers, this was not always the case. Further, in terms of the structure of the
84. Sam Schechner, Europe Targets U.S. Web Firms: French, German Officials Call for
Greater Power to Regulate Internet Companies, Wall Street J. (Nov. 27, 2014, 6:39 PM), http:/
/www.wsj.com/articles/French-german-officials-call-for-fresh-look-at-internet-giants-141711
0508 (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
85. Commission Decision No. 2000/276/EC (Airtours/First Choice), 2000 O.J. (L 93) 1,
overruled by Case T-342/99, Airtours plc v. Comm’n, 2004 E.C.R. II-1790.
86. Commission Decision No. 2004/276/EC (Schneider/Legrand), 2004 O.J. (L 101) 1,
overruled by Case T-310/01, Schneider Electric SA v. Comm’n, 2002 E.C.R. II-4075.
87. Commission Decision No. 2004/124/EC (Tetra Laval/Sidel), 2004 O.J. (L 43) 13, over-
ruled by Case T-5/02, Tetra Laval BV v. Comm’n, 2002 E.C.R. II-4389; Commission Decision
No. 2004/103/EC (Tetra Laval/Sidel), 2004 O.J. (L 38) 1, overruled by Case T-80/02, Tetra Laval
BV v. Comm’n, 2002 E.C.R. II-4521.
88. See Vivek Ghosal & D. Daniel Sokol, Policy Innovations, Political Preferences, and Car-
tel Prosecutions, 48 Rev. Indus. Org. 405, 409 (2016) [hereinafter Ghosal & Sokol, Policy
Innovations]; Vivek Ghosal & D. Daniel Sokol, The Evolution of U.S. Cartel Enforcement, 57 J.L.
& Econ. S51, S51–54 (2014).
89. See Ghosal & Sokol, Policy Innovations, supra note 88, at 414–15.
90. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408
(2004).
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cartel policies and the enforcement tools, the two jurisdictions differ. Most
importantly, the United States imposes criminal penalties for collusion while
the European Union does not.91 And, in a recent shift, the United States, in
contrast to the European Union, now recognizes that a robust compliance
program may lead to a penalty reduction.92 Finally, European case law and
enforcement on information sharing is more aggressive than the United
States.93 These differences lead to potentially disparate policy outcomes, as
the discussion below will explore.
To understand current U.S. cartel policy, it helps to understand the
shifts that have occurred over time—namely, increasingly severe punish-
ments for both corporations and individuals. In the past, criminal cartel
enforcement significantly underdeterred both firms and individuals. For ex-
ample, imprisonment was rarely used (there was a gap between 1921 and
1959 in which there were no cartel-related incarcerations) and when it was,
jail time was minimal.94 Indeed, a Sherman Act section 1 crime did not
become a felony until 1974.95
It was not until the Reagan presidency that the total number of cartel
prosecutions increased dramatically—although these prosecutions were
targeted primarily at small domestic cartels.96 Modern prosecutions against
global cartels did not begin until the Clinton Administration; the prosecu-
tions began then only because of the policy innovation of a revised leniency
program. The revised program encouraged a firm to defect from the cartel
with the promise of no criminal penalties and single damages if it cooper-
ated fully with the prosecuting authorities.97 Although there have been fewer
cartels prosecuted since the 1990s, both the number of days in jail for indi-
viduals and the number of foreign nationals in jail have increased considera-
bly, as have the level of fines for companies and individuals.98 These changes
in part reflect further changes in the statutory limits for fines and
incarceration.
The figures below offer some descriptive statistics that illustrate these
shifts in cartel prosecutions over time.
91. See Ghosal & Sokol, Policy Innovations, supra note 88, at 409–11, 425–427.
92. See id. at 411.
93. See Maarten Pieter Schinkel, Effective Cartel Enforcement in Europe, 30 World Com-
petition 539, 540–44 (2007).
94. See Ghosal & Sokol, Policy Innovations, supra note 88, at 410–11.
95. Id. at 409.
96. See id. at 423–25
97. Id. at 410–11.
98. Id. at 417.
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Figure 1. Fine per Corporation (Real 2009 Dollar ’000s)99
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Figure 1 offers a time-series view of the increasing amount of fines im-
posed on firms that have pled guilty to collusion under section 1 of the
Sherman Act. The trend is toward increasingly higher fines, particularly
since the emphasis on the detection and prosecution of large international
cartels, the revision of the leniency program, and statutory increases to the
financial penalties and the maximum period of incarceration.
Figure 2. Total Incarceration Days Ordered by Court100
?
0
5 ,0 0 0
10 ,0 0 0
15 ,0 0 0
20 ,0 0 0
25 ,0 0 0
30 ,0 0 0
35 ,0 0 0
40 ,0 0 0
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
To
ta
l I
nc
ar
ce
ra
tio
n 
D
ay
s
O
rd
er
ed
 b
y 
C
ou
rt
Y e a r
99. Based on total corporate fines divided by the GDP Deflator. Total corporate fines are
based on statistics from Workload Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice: Antitrust Division,
https://www.justice.gov/atr/division-operations [https://perma.cc/J5KS-9K89]. Real GDP
Deflator, which is Nominal GDP divided by Real GDP in Chained 2009 Dollars, is based on
statistics from National Economic Accounts: Gross Domestic Product (GDP), U.S. Dep’t of
Commerce: Bureau of Econ. Analysis, http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp [https:/
/perma.cc/4P5V-4ZSA].
100. Based on the average days of incarceration ordered multiplied by number of
individuals sentenced to incarceration. Both variables are based on statistics from Workload
Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice: Antitrust Division, https://www.justice.gov/atr/division-
operations [https://perma.cc/J5KS-9K89].
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As Figure 2 illustrates, individual sanctions for cartel participation in
terms of total number of days in jail have also increased over time in the
United States. The increased time of incarceration mirrors the ratcheting up
of financial penalties.
Europe was slower to fight against cartels than the United States. Indeed,
cartel promotion and facilitation were a part of European industrial policy
for a considerable period of the European integration project.101 It was not
until the introduction of a leniency program in 1996 by DG Competition
that cartel prosecution in Europe began in earnest.102 The 1990s and early
2000s saw further tweaks to the system, including changes to leniency and
fines.103 More recently, DG Competition introduced a settlement notice with
a 10 percent discount that accrued to participating firms.104 It also moved to
decentralize cartel enforcement to the national competition authorities.105
Then, in 2014 and 2015 the European Parliament and the Council of the
European Commission tweaked immunity to limit liability in private follow-
on actions for damages106 and to ensure that leniency statements and settle-
ment submissions by the parties would not be used in follow-on actions.107
Figure 3. Total Cartel Fines (Real 2009 Dollar ’000s)108
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101. See David J. Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe:
Protecting Prometheus 354–56 (1998).
102. Ghosal & Sokol, Policy Innovations, supra note 88, at 425–27.
103. See Martin Carree et al., European Antitrust Policy 1957–2004: An Analysis of Commis-
sion Decisions, 36 Rev. Indus. Org. 97, 103 (2010).
104. Commission Notice on the Conduct of Settlement Procedures in View of the Adoption of
Decisions Pursuant to Article 7 and Article 23 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 in Cartel
Cases, 2008 O.J. (C 167) 1, 5.
105. See Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines Imposed Pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of
Regulation No. 1/2003, 2006 O.J. (C 210) 2.
106. Parliament and Council Directive 2014/104/EU, art. 11(4), 2014 O.J. (L 349) 1, 15.
107. Id. arts. 6(6), 7(1); Commission Regulation 773/2004, art. 16, 2004 O.J. (L 123) 18,
22, amended by Commission Regulation 2015/1348, 2015 O.J. (L 208) 3.
108. Based on data from European Comm’n, Cartel Statistics (2016), http://ec.europa
.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf [https://perma.cc/CF5Y-DKBA], Maarten Pieter
Schinkel, Effective Cartel Enforcement in Europe (Amsterdam Ctr. for Law & Econ., Working
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Figure 3 shows that, like in the United States, average fines in Europe
have increased over time due to the increases in penalties and cartel
detection.
The introduction of leniency and the use of higher penalties in both
jurisdictions suggest convergence on cartel enforcement between the United
States and Europe.109 Yet, differences remain. And in some cases, differences
across the two jurisdictions are increasing due to Europe’s poor understand-
ing of how best to structure incentives to increase cartel detection.110
The idea of agency costs is well known in the economics and finance
literatures.111 These costs arise because agents within an organization may
have different incentives than do the organization’s principals. In antitrust,
where there are rogue employees involved in collusion, the agency costs may
be significant. Further, the system externalizes punishment for individuals,
and, due to overly weak punishments and low detection, the incentives for
wrongdoing between individuals and management often align—whether in
the form of collusion or management turning a blind eye—because of
higher stock returns due to the non-detection of the collusion.112
DOJ Antitrust has recently worked to create two incentives that increase
the agency costs between firms and individuals such that firms will no
longer tolerate cosmetic compliance that shields them from the illegal be-
havior of managers who collude. (This, of course, has the paradoxical effect
of increasing agency costs from when they were aligned for wrongdoing and
reducing agency costs to align incentives for pro-compliance behavior.) The
prior DOJ Antitrust approach was to conceptualize every cartel case as a case
of failed compliance and to give no inducement for a robust compliance
system.113 This approach was out of touch with entity-liability theory. In the
area of entity liability, Arlen and Kraakman theorized that a composite re-
gime that blends elements of both negligence and strict liability would lead
to an optimal outcome because it better aligns incentives.114 This composite-
Paper No. 2006-14, 2007), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=948641
[https://perma.cc/75AM-E5ZB], and Cartels Cases, European Comm’n, http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/cartels/cases/cases.html [https://perma.cc/WYQ5-U3K9]. Currency calculations
are from US Dollar (USD), European Cent. Bank, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/exchange/
eurofxref/html/eurofxref-graph-usd.en.html [https://perma.cc/G3QY-7XMT].
109. D. Daniel Sokol, Policing the Firm, 89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 785 (2013).
110. See Keith N. Hylton, Deterrence and Antitrust Punishment: Firms Versus Agents, 100
Iowa L. Rev. 2069, 2070 (2015); Sokol, supra note 109, at 791–92.
111. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976).
112. See Paolo Buccirossi & Giancarlo Spagnolo, Corporate Governance and Collusive Be-
havior, in 2 Issues in Competition Law and Policy 1219, 1224–25 (Wayne Dale Collins et
al. eds., 2008); Sokol, supra note 109, at 788.
113. See Sokol, supra note 109, at 818.
114. Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of
Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 687, 692–94 (1997).
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liability approach has been followed by other antitrust agencies.115 DG Com-
petition, however, has yet to follow this composite approach, even though
some national competition authorities within Europe do. Rather, DG Com-
petition believes in strict liability for firms and does not offer any credit for
robust compliance programs.
DOJ Antitrust has provided penalty mitigation on the basis of a robust
compliance program in two circumstances: Kayaba Industry Co., Ltd.116 and
Barclays.117 In Kayaba, DOJ Antitrust provided a roadmap of the elements a
robust compliance program should have: support for compliance among top
management, the use of an anonymous antitrust “hotline,” antitrust compli-
ance training, monitoring of employees who are high risk for antitrust, and
the company’s willingness to discipline antitrust violators.118 These changes
echo policy changes across antitrust agencies in other jurisdictions. Some
agencies have even created antitrust compliance guidelines.119
In Barclays, DOJ Antitrust issued its first-ever award of credit against a
fine so that the cartel member could implement a robust compliance pro-
gram that met the criteria of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for penalty
mitigation for compliance programs. Of significance was that Barclays im-
plemented a compliance program after it had pleaded guilty to price fixing
in the LIBOR cartel.120 When it was found to have participated in the
FOREX cartel, Barclays received a penalty reduction based on its compliance
program while the other banks that pleaded guilty that day did not.121 These
two cases show that DOJ Antitrust has begun a process of aligning incentives
of firms with more robust compliance by rewarding them when they comply
and by punishing individuals when they veer from firm interests.
DG Competition remains the one major global holdout to using mod-
ern tools to increase firms’ incentives to invest in greater compliance. Worse,
115. See, e.g., Autorite´ de la Concurrence, Framework-Document of 10 February
2012 on Antitrust Compliance Programmes 7 (2012), www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/
doc/framework_document_compliance_10february2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/7GPF-U3VY];
Competition Bureau Canada, Bulletin: Corporate Compliance Programs 5 (2015),
http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/vwapj/cb-bulletin-corp-compliance-e
.pdf/$FILE/cb-bulletin-corp-compliance-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4PX-BCH4]; Office of
Fair Trading, How Your Business Can Achieve Compliance with Competition Law
31–32 (2011), www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/ca-and-cartels/competition-awareness-compliance/
oft1341.pdf [https://perna.cc/ULX2-H4KV].
116. United States Sentencing Memorandum and Motion for a Downward Departure
Pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines § 8C4.1 at 6–8, United States v. Kayaba In-
dus. Co., No. 1:15-CR-00098 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 5, 2015), 2015 WL 6164705 [hereinafter Kayaba
Sentencing Memorandum].
117. Plea Agreement at 11-12, 15–16, United States v. Barclays PLC, No. 3:15-CR-77 (D.
Conn. May 20, 2015).
118. Kayaba Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 116, at 7–8.
119. See, e.g., Anne Riley & D. Daniel Sokol, Rethinking Compliance, 3 J. Antitrust En-
forcement 31, 48–49 (2015).
120. See Plea Agreement, supra note 117, at 9.
121. Id. at 11–12, 15–16.
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there is case law to suggest that DG Competition will use a company’s com-
pliance program against it.122 Compounding the problem is the fact that in
Europe there is parental liability for subsidiaries when the two share a com-
pliance program.123
A shift from strict liability to composite liability for entities is not the
only innovation where DOJ Antitrust and DG Competition have diverged.
In the area of individual sanctions, DOJ Antitrust continues to tweak its
criminal antitrust program by creating better incentives with regard to indi-
vidual accountability and wrongdoing. This emphasis on individual sanc-
tions has become more pronounced recently due to the September 2015
DOJ “Yates Memo.”124 The Yates Memo is a DOJ-wide document that has
put increased focus on DOJ prosecutions and policy guidance.125 It empha-
sizes the need for DOJ prosecutions to focus on individuals.126 Though the
Yates Memo is relatively recent and its full effects are as yet unclear, the
increase in individual penalties (and the corresponding incentives to defect
from a cartel by providing information to DOJ) might indeed lead to better
detection of cartels.
Speeches by the top DOJ Antitrust criminal enforcer have similarly em-
phasized the importance of individual prosecutions.127 The push toward
greater individual accountability in a criminal antitrust setting predates the
Yates Memo, with the DOJ Antitrust leadership focusing on increased cor-
porate responsibility to take action against individuals in their organizations
who have been active in cartel conduct.128 Further, increased criminal incar-
ceration in the United States for antitrust violations must also be viewed
hand in hand with more aggressive incarceration of foreign defendants,
122. See Commission Decision No. 1999/210/EC (British Sugar), 1999 O.J. (L 76) 1,
43–44.
123. Case T-76/08, EI DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Comm’n, 2012 E.C.R., ¶ 47 (deliv-
ered Feb. 2, 2012), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf?doclang=EN&
text=&pageIndex=0&part=1&mode=lst&docid=119007&occ=first&dir=&cid=400226 [https:/
/perma.cc/4HNV-G28Q].
124. Memorandum from the U.S. Dep’t of Justice to the Assistant Att’y Gens. and U.S.
Att’ys (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download [https://perma.cc/
G2J8-YGXN].
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1–2.
127. See, e.g., Brent Snyder, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at
the Yale Global Antitrust Enforcement Conference: Individual Accountability for Antitrust
Crimes (Feb. 19, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-assistant-attorney-general-
brent-snyder-delivers-remarks-yale-global-antitrust [https://perma.cc/PJD5-P92N].
128. See, e.g., Bill Baer, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Remarks for the Georgetown University Law Center Global Antitrust Enforcement Sympo-
sium: Prosecuting Antitrust Crimes 8 (Sept. 10, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/517741/
download [https://perma.cc/8A3F-4EJE] (“It is hard to imagine how companies can foster a
corporate culture of compliance if they still employ individuals in positions with senior man-
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including the use of extradition of foreign nationals.129 Each of these steps
has brought U.S. cartel enforcement closer to the optimum.
Compliance is the preventive part of cartel enforcement. Cartel enforce-
ment also extends to breaking up cartels and to ensuring that legal tacit
collusion (based on parallel behavior)130 does not cross into illegal tacit
agreement.131 “Information exchange” is the area of antitrust that deals with
determining when a firm has crossed over from tacit collusion to tacit
agreement.132
Information exchange generally is a necessary part of a well-functioning
market to achieve legal and legitimate business purposes: for example, joint
research and development, or lower costs for production. In the United
States, because of the potential pro-competitive effects, information ex-
changes fall within the rule of reason. The Joint DOJ/FTC Guidelines for
Collaboration Among Competitors provide more guidance in this area.133
EU enforcement in the area of information exchange is also more aggressive
than its U.S. counterpart; the European Union treats information exchange
as object infringement and therefore as a hard-core violation of antitrust.134
The requirement for such a hard-core offense may be satisfied if information
exchanged is “strategic,” defined broadly.135 This critical difference between
129. See Snyder, supra note 127 (stating that “culpable foreign nationals, just like U.S. co-
conspirators, serve significant prison sentences for violating the antitrust laws of the United
States”).
130. Jonathan B. Baker, Two Sherman Act Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, the Oligop-
oly Problem, and Contemporary Economic Theory, 38 Antitrust Bull., 143, 179 (1993)
(“[A]ntitrust law clarified that the idea of an agreement describes a process that firms engage
in, not merely the outcome that they reach. Not every parallel pricing outcome constitutes an
agreement because not every such outcome was reached through the process to which the law
objects: a negotiation that concludes when the firms convey mutual assurances that the under-
standing they reached will be carried out.”).
131. William H. Page, Tacit Agreement Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, Antitrust L.J.
(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 11–12) (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
132. Id. (manuscript at 49–51).
133. Fed. Trade Comm’n & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for Col-
laborations Among Competitors 12 (2000), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attach-
ments/press-releases/ftc-doj-issue-antitrust-guidelines-collaborations-among-competitors/
ftcdojguidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/WT3X-Z4KU].
134. See Brian Sher & Barbara Sicalides, Practical Law Company, Competitor
Collaborations: New EU Guidelines and US Law Compared (2011), http://www.nabarro
.com/Downloads/Competitor_collaborations_new_EU_guidelines_and_US_law_compared
.pdf [https://perma.cc/3UT2-NUU3]; see also, e.g., Case T-588/08, Dole Food Co. v. Comm’n
(Dole Food), 2013 E.C.R., ¶ 62 (delivered Mar. 14, 2013), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/docu
ment/document_print.jsf?doclang=EN&text=&pageIndex=0&part=1&mode=lst&docid=1349
81&occ=first&dir=&cid=399963 [https://perma.cc/4SVK-4HEE].
135. Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union to Horizontal Co-operation Agreements, 2011 O.J. (C 11) 1, 19 [hereinafter
Commission Applicability Guidelines]; see also Howard Rosenblatt & Tomas Nilsson, Analyst
Calls and Price Signaling Under EU Law, Antitrust Source, June 2012, at 1, 4 (“At a time
when advancements in economic analysis typically favor more nuanced competitive assess-
ments over bright line tests, the Guidelines contend that one kind of information exchange is
‘by its very nature’ likely to restrict competition: ‘Information exchanges between competitors
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U.S. and EU approaches suggests that there are more cases in Europe that
are being captured with prosecution than may actually be cases of collusive
conduct, as opposed to tacit collusion.136 One recent EU case involving Dole
Food (in which banana importers exchanged information regarding banana
price-setting factors, leading to banana importer liability) suggests aggressive
enforcement in this area.137 This difference across U.S. and European infor-
mation-exchange enforcement remains unresolved. But in practice, the Eu-
ropean approach is stricter; companies who want a global approach to
compliance will need to follow the European model.
Conclusion
The United States and Europe seem divided in a number of areas as to
antitrust as a matter of policy and case law. Gifford and Kudrle provide the
basis for this explanation: With its steadfast economic focus, antitrust in the
United States has a clear goal. In Europe, however, the goals remain mud-
dled as the continent attempts to modernize the jurisprudence to a more
effects-based economic approach. Two major factors contribute to this pos-
ture: First, there remain vestiges of noneconomic goals in the case law. And,
second, the European Commission may use the case law to aggressively
bring actions that it might otherwise not pursue, were the courts less defer-
ential in conduct cases than in merger cases. This divergence between the
United States and Europe is particularly pronounced with regard to single-
firm conduct and technology markets in particular. Europe remains the
more aggressive antitrust enforcer, possibly reflecting a larger anti-tech bias
stemming from concern over privacy, the lack of European tech champions,
and an overall dearth of support for the market relative to the United States.
In the area of cartels, despite agreement on the need for enforcement,
the United States and Europe disagree on how best to tweak the leniency
system to get closer to optimal deterrence. Further, the law on information
exchanges in Europe remains more aggressive than in the United States.
Unfortunately, divergence has negative global repercussions with regard
to business planning, which hurts consumers worldwide. While Gifford and
Kudrle are hopeful that future convergence is possible, that outcome is only
desirable if it is built around a framework for the two jurisdictions that
supports an economics-based approach centered on actual competitive
effects.
of individualized data regarding intended future prices or quantities should therefore be con-
sidered a restriction of competition by object.’ ” (quoting Commission Applicability Guidelines,
supra, at 16)).
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Union, a concerted practice to fix prices may exist even regardless of firms’ market practices,
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